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The United States' Haiti Intervention:
The Dangers of "Redefined" National
Security Interests
W.Q. BEARDSLEE
I. INTRODUCTION
As the current Administration plans to use United States troops
to provide humanitarian relief in central Africa,' the subject of mil-
itary intervention will once again become the focus of much debate.
Other interventions, such as Bosnia, Somalia, Panama, Haiti and the
Persian Gulf created controversy in their times. The United States
(U.S.) justified its placement of forces in these regions by claiming
national security interests were at stake. The interests jeopardized by
the events in these regions include a number of subjects not tradition-
ally considered to be within the realm of national security interests.
Because of the recent developments in Zaire, Rwanda and Burun-
di and the potential for similar crises elsewhere, this "redefinition" of
national security interests should be examined. One effective approach
is to analyze this redefinition in the context of an intervention which
has already occurred. This essay is an attempt to clarify the redefini-
tion of national security interests and then examine this redefinition in
light of the U.S. military intervention in Haiti. This article will exam-
ine the redefinition of national security interest, determine that the
U.S. had none in Haiti at the time of the intervention and state an
alternative which would have given more legal justification for the
actions of the U.S. in Haiti.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL REDEFINITION OF "NATIONAL SECURITY
INTEREST"
A. The traditional definition of national security interest
While universal acceptance of the definition of many terms with
immense geopolitical ramifications is often difficult, the actions of the
United States over recent years have altered almost any traditional
definition of a national security interest. Since World War II, the exec-
utive leadership of the U.S. has used the issue of national security to
act in many situations.
1. Charles Aldinger, U.S. Might Modify Troop Plan for Zaire, THE DENVER
POST, Nov. 17, 1996, at 3A.
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In the late 1940's, the U.S. executive leadership developed the
theme of "containment" to counteract any imagined or real threat of
communist expansion. This policy continued under subsequent presi-
dential administrations until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the
early 1990's. While different terms such as "massive retaliation," "flexi-
ble response," "detente," and "conventional build up" were used to
describe each leader's policy, the overall theme was "to conduct a long
term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive
tendencies until either the break up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet
power."2
One could argue that the executive leadership potentially defines
its national security interests through the organization of its depart-
ments. In line with this view, a description of the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense provides insights. "Overall international security policy
and political-military affairs" for the Department of Defense therefore
include the operation of NATO, foreign military sales, arms limitation
agreements, international trade and technology, regional security af-
fairs and special operations in relation to low intensity conflicts.'
B. The "redefinition" of national security interests
The current administration's publication describing its stance on
matters of national security includes a number of nontraditional sub-
jects.' While the publication mentions traditional subjects such as the
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, the ability to respond to major re-
gional situations, counter-terrorism and the control of weapons of mass
destruction,5 the document displays a new focus for the U.S. by includ-
ing drug trafficking, noncombatant evacuation operations, disaster
relief, space, peace operations and environmental areas as being of
U.S. concern.' On an entirely new note, the economic vitality of the
U.S. is also addressed as a component of this national security strate-
gy.' Finally, the White House identifies the protection of human rights
as a key factor in the promotion of democracy. The Administration
expected to target states with "large economies, critical locations, nu-
clear weapons or the potential to generate refugee flows into our na-
tion"8 as primary national security concerns.
These new security concerns, exemplified by international crime,
2. George F. Kennan, writing as "X" in The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOR-
EIGN AFF. 566 (July 1947).
3. 1995/96 U.S. GOV'T MANUAL 179.
4. WILLIAM J. CLINTON, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND
ENLARGEMENT (Washington D.C.: The White House, July 1994).
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id. at 18.
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narcotics traffic and illegal refugee flow, have been termed "transna-
tional concerns" by some authors.9 While these concerns do not direct-
ly affect the security of a state, they can profoundly affect the lifestyle
of U.S. citizens."
(1) Recent debate has focused upon the question of whether the pro-
motion of democracy in other states is a national security interest.
This debate is relevant to the Haiti intervention, as the restoration of
the democratically elected leader of that state was a clearly publicized
goal of the intervention
A number of arguments support the categorization of democracy
promotion as a national security interest. One is that no two democra-
cies have ever had a war between themselves.12 The victory in the
Cold War may also be seen as the direct result of the strength and rec-
ognition democratic governments held around the world at the time."3
Furthermore, promoting democracy in the Western Hemisphere fore-
closes outside powers from gaining influence over a strategically posi-
tioned neighboring state.1 ' This expansion of democratic government
to nearby states also helps "create better relations with our neighbors
to the south and provides an improved framework for hemispheric
understanding," including hemispheric prosperity. 5
In sum, many scholars argue and conclude that there is a right to
assist democratic restoration and that it is only the core of a much
broader right of humanitarian assistance."8 The Charter of the Orga-
nization of American States (OAS) declares that representative democ-
racy is essential for the peace and development of the region." The
support of democracy has become associated with the maintenance of
peace and security.18 Some equate the deposition of the democratically
elected government by an internal force equal to that of another state
infringing upon the democratic state's sovereignty. 9
It can also be argued that the toppling of a democracy can have
9. Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Clawson, New Strategic Priorities, WASH. Q.,
Vol. 18, No. 2 at 109, April 1995.
10. Id. at 123.
11. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
12. RUDOLPH J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 2 (1994).
13. Tony Smith, In Defense of Intervention, FOREIGN AFF., Vol. 73, No. 6,
Nov./Dec. 1994, at 45.
14. Id. at 37.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human
Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5
DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 329, 330 (1995).
17. Id. at 332.
18. Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention; When Do Human-
itarian Concerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199 (1993).
19. Id.
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serious external effects. As one author notes, "the message to potential
usurpers of power would be that fragile democracies are up for
grabs."2" The Haiti intervention can be seen as a warning to other
usurpers that they will be resisted and therefore provides a deterrent
effect, according to this argument
These arguments do not address a key issue. Regardless of wheth-
er there is a right to intervene for the promotion of democracy or hu-
man rights, is it within a state's interest to do so? In the Machiavel-
lian universe of international relations, unless national security inter-
ests are at stake, states realistically have little incentive to put their
military at risk. While some may urge that a violation of fundamental
human rights creates a duty for the international community to inter-
fere,21 such a controversial statement should not serve as the basis for
a full-scale military operation and intervention.
(2) Another issue central to the Haiti intervention centers on the
subject of immigration. If large numbers of refugees fleeing a state
appear on the shores of the U.S., the U.S. would have a national secu-
rity interest defined in broad terms and a right to intervene in the
refugee-sponsoring state as a method of exercising its sovereignty or
controlling its own borders.22
One situation where the internal violation of human rights led to
external effects was in Iraq with its Kurdish population. The exodus of
refugees from Iraq to neighboring states clearly created a threat to
international peace. This, in turn, led to the UN Security Council's
actions in that region.21 It is crucial to note that the refugees fleeing
Iraq in that situation were seeking to avoid the systematic destruction
of their people. While there were human rights violations in Haiti, the
refugees fleeing to neighboring states sought economic betterment, not
the avoidance of genocide. As a result, it is difficult to compare the two
situations effectively and immigration as a national security interest is
difficult to find in the Haiti intervention.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HAITIAN PROBLEM AS COMPARED
TO THE NEW DEFINITION
Many arguments can be made to support the right to assist the
restoration of a democracy when it is a violently overthrown or ob-
20. Fielding, supra note 16, at 364.
21. A. CARRILLO SALCEDO, SUMMING UP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL; PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE BUILDING 327 (Rene-Jean Dupuy
ed., 1993).
22. Smith, supra note 13, at 43.
23. Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The Blurring of the
Mandate for the Use of Force in Maintaining International Law and Security, 19 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 1 (1995).
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structed as a legitimate democratic government.24 The violence in
Haiti leading to the downfall of the democratically elected government
could be formulated as a potential threat to the international peace,
allowing the UN Security Council to adopt enforcement measures un-
der Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it later did. Some experts now
argue that a new right supporting the unilateral intervention of one
state into another for the purposes of humanitarian intervention actu-
ally exists.25
A procedural question remains, regardless of whether or not the
U.S. will recognize the immigration and democratization aspects of the
Haiti situation as national security interests. Without a treaty obliging
the U.S. to intervene in Haiti in certain circumstances, the basis of a
right to intervene remains unclear. Some argue that the UN Charter
obligates the U.S. to take the actions it did in Haiti. This argument
fails because it would then logically follow that every state in existence
is therefore obligated to intervene in such situations.
Another problem with the U.S. intervention in Haiti lies in estab-
lishing a suitable standard for intervention. It was obvious the Cedras'
regime was a non-democratic military junta. However, in the future,
the characterization of a regime as non-democratic may be more diffi-
cult to evaluate. It would be easy to imagine a situation where the
democratic character of a government was ambiguous and unclear. The
lack of a clear standard creates difficulties, as then all states will be
subject to judgment from the UN or other states as to whether their
government is truly democratic for UN standards.
The democratic government overthrown in Haiti existed for less
than a year. Prior to Aristide's election, the Duvalier dictatorships had
served U.S. interests for two generations. The policy motivations for a
shift from support for dictatorships to an invasion to protect a democ-
racy remains unclear. It is important to note that no Cold War type of
security interest was at stake in Haiti at the time of the intervention.
Perhaps the intervention was the result of the lack of a Soviet threat.
The U.S. is now able to act by methods and in areas it was unable to
before, due to the potential reactions from the Soviets. Regardless,
absent the threat of Soviet expansionism, the U.S. could not continue
to operate under its Cold War rationale. How then can the U.S. consid-
er a non-democratic Haiti a threat to national security interests when
it tolerated and even supported Haitian dictatorships for decades?
This reason alone refutes any reasonable assertion that the U.S.
had national security interests, redefined or traditional, at stake when
it militarily intervened in Haiti. On a larger scale, the actions of the
U.S. then suggest that every non-democratic state should fear military
24. Fielding, supra note 16, at 331.
25. Id.
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intervention in the U.S.'s continuing promotion of democracy in other
sovereign states.
Many alternatives existed to the immigration problem. It had
been controlled and could foreseeably be controlled in the future by
using the U.S. Coast Guard or other armed forces to deter refugees.
One could also argue that the U.S. could easily absorb the refugees.
The current Administration exacerbated this problem itself by continu-
ing to impose the economic sanctions." These sanctions affected the
already poverty-stricken state by creating massive shortages of food
and fuel and spurring refugee immigration to the nearest states. While
the dictators' actions against their people undoubtedly impacted ref-
ugee flows,27 the immigration problem was further exacerbated by the
Administration when it repealed the previous policy of returning ref-
ugees to Haiti and instead allowed for "on-ship asylum." The result
was a exponential increase in the number of refugees seeking asylum
and immigration to the U.S.
The OAS served an important role in the restoration of democracy
in Haiti. The OAS resolutions denouncing the violations of human
rights in Haiti called for intervention and the restoration of the gov-
ernment. It is important to note, however, that the U.S. is not a party
to the OAS Human Rights treaty.28 Accordingly the U.S. had no duty
nor the legal obligation to follow the course of action that the OAS
advocated for the protection of human rights.
Some argue that the approval of the UN Security Council con-
dones the actions of the U.S. in Haiti. Officially, the operation was
controlled by the UN. This still does not relieve the U.S. of responsibil-
ity for its actions. The UN Security Council standards for such inter-
ventions are ambiguous, unclear and the subject of much criticism.2 9
The fact that the U.S. financed and executed the operation makes the
UN Security Council actions nothing more than a formality the U.S.
followed to promote its own interests. As a result of these analyses,
one can conclude that no national security interests existed in Haiti.
However, if the intervention was to occur regardless of this lack of
national security interests, then the issue becomes how the U.S. and
UN could have justified their actions.
26. Steven Greenhouse, Lawmakers oppose an Invasion of Haiti Now, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, July 10, 1994, at Sec. 1, p.3, Col. 1.
27. Smith, supra note 13, at 42.
28. O.A.S. HUMAN RIGHTS CHARTER, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
29. See Fink, supra note 23.
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IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for UN members to defend
themselves individually or collectively if an armed attack occurs
against a member."0 In the Haiti situation, the UN Security Council
acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,31 which includes Article
51. However, the UN Security Council did not specify under which
Article it was authorizing the military intervention. It would be more
justifiable from a legal standpoint had the U.S. and the UN Security
Council acted specifically under Article 51, allowing for collective self
defense. Article 51 does not specify whether the armed attack required
for such self-defense must be internal or external in nature, nor even
from a different state.
One could argue that the implicit meaning of the Article requires
external actors, as the U.N Charter renounces intervention in domestic
matters." Regardless, the UN Security Council would have at mini-
mum had a sound legal argument supporting the Haiti intervention
under Article 51. The language of "armed attack" was left obscure by
choice. 3 This was arguably done to allow states to act in self-defense
in a number of situations. In Nicaragua v. U.S., the court held that
indirect aggression could rise to the level of "armed attack."' In fact
there is little agreement on the definition of this phrase and many au-
thors define it as one that can fall short of an invasion by government
troops.3 " If this phrase was meant to encompass only an attack by an
external state with armed troops, then the drafters would have clearly
stated this. Such a distinction is a vitally important one, and the
drafters' choice of language for this section leads one to conclude that
"armed attack" is meant to include situations such as Haiti, where a
military junta takes control of the government by force.
That such actions are allowed by Article 51 cannot be disputed.
This section of the UN Charter was added to ensure that regional or
collective security organizations could use force until the UN Security
Council took measures to restore international peace and security.3"
Therefore, Article 51 of the UN Charter would allow the U.S. to inter-
vene in Haiti as a response to the "armed attack" upon a member of
the regional, collective security group of the Organization for American
States.
30. U.N. CHARTER art.51.
31. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
32. U.N. CHARTER art.2, 17.
33. Brian K. McCalmon, Note, States, Refugees and Self-Defense, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 215, 225 (1996).
34. Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J.at 103-104, 195.
35. McCalmon, supra note 33, at 227.
36. Malvina Halberstam, The Right to Self-Defense Once the Security Council
Takes Action, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 229, 242 (1996).
37. Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S.
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The U.S. therefore could have exercised its policy without the
initial involvement of the UN. Collective self-defense allows states
which have a mutual assistance agreement to come to one another's
defense. 8 It also requires the UN members who exercise the right of
self-defense to report the action to the UN Security Council after the
defensive measures have been taken.39 The U.S. could have then in-
tervened under the OAS as a mutual assistance agreement and then
reported these actions to the UN Security Council. While this essay
finds no national security interests present which would justify the
U.S. intervention in Haiti, it was possible for the U.S. to do so without
having to use the UN Security Council initially. The use of Article 51
would be a stronger legal justification for the intervention in Haiti
than the ambiguous and unclear reasoning the UN Security Council
relied upon. This ambiguity supports the contention that the UN Secu-
rity Council was used merely as a "stamp of approval" for the exercise
of U.S. policy.
It is also interesting to consider that some commentators have
determined a state's negligent creation of refugee flows to another
state constitutes an armed attack under Article 51. This argument
would also support the U.S. intervention with a different but perhaps
stronger justification than that actually relied upon.'0
V. CONCLUSION
This essay found no redefined national security interests present
in Haiti at the time of the intervention. While immigration may have
been a concern, it was not taking place on a scale that could not be
controlled by the U.S. and reached a crisis as a national security inter-
est. The immigration problem was also the result of U.S. and UN ac-
tions in that area. The promotion of human rights and democratization
remain controversial as national security interests. This article found
that these cannot be realistically or logically included as national secu-
rity interests. This article also found flaws in the legal justification
both the UN Security Council and the U.S. used to support their ac-
tions.
Perhaps these defects in policy and reasoning explain why Haiti's
military junta stepped aside only when they learned U.S. planes were
in the air. 1 This late acquiescence to the UN and U.S. can perhaps be
explained by the fact that the junta did not understand that human
3, as amended February 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607.
38. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 301 (1949).
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
40. See McCalmon, supra note 33.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA, DEPT.
OF STATE DISPATCH, Vol. 7, No. 30, July 22, 1996.
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rights, immigration and the promotion of democracy might constitute
national security interests to the U.S. Many conflicts occur when states
misunderstand the security interests of other states. This confusion
over the redefinition of national security interests could likely lead to
violence and the Haitian intervention could be seen as a dangerous
precedent. While violence against U.S. troops was avoided in the inter-
vention, the next situation may not be so peaceful. Unless the U.S.
clearly states its "redefined" national security interests, it risks the
potential for conflict and violence in its future. If such redefined inter-
ests do cause conflict in the future similar to the Haiti situation, the
U.S. and UN should better justify its actions under Article 51 of the
UN Charter.

